Ammunition for Peacemakers

When you play russian roulette, and the first four chambers are empty, should you then assume the other two also are? Taken from _Ammunition for Peacemakers_, by Phillips P. Moulton, pp 13:

It is probably true that the massive stockpiling of nuclear weapons tends to deter a rational ruler from starting a war when there is ample time for reflection and no crisis exists. But that is the least likely way a nuclear war might start. Strengthening nuclear capabilities to guard against that one unlikely scenario greatly increases the probability of war starting in other ways.

Despite allegedly deterrent arsenals, national leaders may start a war because of one (or a combination) of these factors:

What defense strategists overlook is that the possible deterrent effect of nuclear striking power is far outweighed by the increasing peril it creates. If we removed the deterrent, the Soviets would almost certainly remove theirs. Our world would then be much safer.
Russell Nelson
Last modified: Thu Jul 27 10:48:33 EDT 2000